Financial stability is a prerequisite to innovation and inclusive finance policies. FSC maintains close market monitoring for any signs of market volatility and works to ensure stability in the financial markets. There are risk factors originating from abroad and from within. FSC focuses on making our economy more resilient from external shocks, such as a disruption in the global supply chain, and supporting Korea’s material, component and equipment industries to help boost their global competitiveness. Internally, FSC is closely monitoring the trends in household debt and seeking reforms to corporate restructuring in order to prevent domestic risk factors from turning into systemic risks. Policies aimed at increasing financial stability also include enhancing fairness in the financial markets by introducing a comprehensive legal framework for the supervision of financial conglomerates, improving market discipline and promoting transparency in corporate disclosure and accounting practices.
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Nov 22, 2010
- Countermeasures against KOSPI's Sudden Plunge on Nov. 11
- BackgroundThe KOSPI index plunged 48 points in the last ten minutes before the market closed on November 11, the options expiry date of the month, as foreign investors cleared their arbitrage positions by selling off KRW2.4 trillion worth of shares.Out of the sell-off worth KRW 2.4 trillion, it turned out that 97% of sell orders were made through a single trading desk. We, the FSC/FSS and Korea Exchange, are currently investigating whether the massive sell-off through the brokerage involved any alleged act of unfair trading.We are also probing into a local investment company, WiseAsset, who suffered huge losses from options trading on November 11, with particular focus on any illegality of the company’s asset management and its internal risk management system.Fluctuations in stock prices are inherent part of capital markets; however, severe volatility over a short period of time caused by a few market forces could leave individual investors unprotected and undermine investors’ credibility in Korean capital markets. In this respect, we plan to thoroughly investigate causes of the incident and come up with needed measures to make capital markets in Korea more stable.Upon a thorough investigation on whether there was any act of unfair trading involved and whether the financial investment company properly managed its investment risks, any violation of relevant laws and regulations will be dealt with strict sanctions to prevent a recurrence of a similar event.Measures to comeThe FSC/FSS will thoroughly review vulnerabilities of Korea’s capital markets as revealed on Nov. 11 and take prompt actions to bring immediately needed reforms to the current market system and practices. Depending on the results of the investigations, we will come up with follow-up measures for the longer term. A. Immediate actions1. Strengthening brokerage firms’ settlement risk managementBrokerage firms are exposed to the so-called settlement risk because they are the first to take respons
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Sep 02, 2010
- Stimulation Plan for Long-term KTB Futures Trade Approved by FSC
- To promote trading of long-term KTB futures, the KRX amended its Derivatives Market Business Regulation and the Financial Services Commission (FSC) approved the amended Regulation on September 1, 2010.As the follow-up of the plan for promoting long-term KTB futures that was devised jointly by the Financial Services Commission, Ministry of Strategy and Finance and KRX, the latest amendment streamlined the regulations related to KTB futures.The key amendments are 1) the harmonization of regulations governing KTB futures to ensure the balanced growth of short-term and long-term KTB futures, 2) stabilization of market operation and 3) reinforcement of market making function in the Derivatives Market.1. Harmonization of regulations governing individual KTB futuresBy minimizing the differences in the regulations applied to short-term and long-term KTB futures, it has been attempted to make easy the trade linking the short-term and long-term KTB futures contracts and enhance the accessibility of KTB futures.(1) To ensure the settlement expediency of 10-year KTB Futures, the plan is made to change the final settlement method from physical delivery to cash settlement. Accordingly, like the case of 3-year KTB Futures, the final settlement price of 10- year KTB Futures will be calculated on the basis of yield of basket bonds for final settlement and present value model for underlying bond and the final settlement day will be changed to T+1 day, i.e., the day after the last trading day, from the existing T+2 day. (2) By considering the recent market interest rate, the coupon rate of underlying bonds of 3-year and 5-year KTB Futures would be lowered to 5% per year from 8% per year in order to enhance the hedge effectiveness.(3) The plan is made to increase the trading unit of 10-year KTB Futures to KRW 100 million at par value from KRW 50 million at par value and lower the quotation unit to 0.01 from current 0.02. However, the tick value of KRW 10,000 will be kept unchanged.(4)
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Aug 02, 2010
- Plans to Enhance the Short-term Financing Market
- Current Status-quo of the Short-term Financing MarketBy short-term financing, we mean wholesale financing among financial institutions by trading or issuing under 1- year maturity products such as Calls, RPs, CPs, and CDs.An analysis of current situation by individual market sectors① (Call Market) Daily average volume of KRW 33 trillion*, which takes up about 50% of the short term financing market.* Reduced down to KRW 11 trillion level, but recently resumed to the pre-crisis level.(’08.9: KRW 29 trillion, ’09.3: KRW 11.5 trillion, ’09.12: KRW 30.2 trillion, ’10.6: KRW 33.1 trillion)② (RP) Trading volume (outstanding balance base) has been consistently growing.(’07: KRW 65 trillion, ’08: KRW 69 trillion, ’09: KRW 72 trillion). Most of the transactions (87%) are large client based.③ (CD) Dropped to KRW 79 trillion level due to the curb on Loan-to-Deposit Ratio regulation, while market trading volume has gone down to KRW 4.5 trillion daily average.Source: Bank of KoreaProblems Detected in the Short-Term Financing MarketThe overriding problem in the short-term financing market is that it is too much concentrated on the Call market which causes distortions to the market function and may entail latent systemic risk.- The convenience of Call transactions using credit based lending with high liquidity and low interest rate triggered the growing dependency of the Call market by financial institutions.- Composition of the short term financing market (as of May ’10): Call (50.5%), RP (16%), CP (17.2%), CD (16.4%) - The Call market’s function has been misled as ‘funding sources’ for the secondary financial institutions’ (e.g. securities houses and mutual savings banks) operating capital and in turn used to invest in high yielding short term KTBs.- In particular, excessive ‘call money’ by securities houses could become a source of potential systemic risk when hit by a sudden credit crunch.- The over-usage of the Call market also led to the unde
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Jul 27, 2010
- Stimulation Plan for Long-term KTB Futures Trade
- The Ministry of Strategy and Finance, Financial Services Commission and Korea Exchange (“KRX”) have jointly prepared the plan to stimulate trading of long-term Korea Treasury Bond (“KTB”) Futures.Recently, an opportunity to promote the trading of long-term KTBs has been presented as a result of growing issuance amount and trading volume of long-term KTBs. As the need to stimulate the 10-year KTB Futures trading volume grew, the task force made of representatives of research community, public sector and private sector was created in January 2010 to prepare the plan for promotion of long-term KTB Futures trade.The causes for poor trading of long-term KTB Futures may be examined in terms of cash market, market making and trading regulations.First, although the annual issuance amount of short-term and long-term KTBs is balanced , the trading condition in the secondary market is dominated by the short-term KTBs. For example, as of the end of June 2010, the outstanding amount of KTBs with maturity longer than 10-year is 46% of total outstanding amount of KTBs, but the trading volume of KTBs with maturity longer than 10-year is mere 13% of total trading volume of KTBs.Second, the market making for 10-year KTB Futures is rather inadequate and the primary dealers (“the PDs”) who account for over 53% of trading volume of 10-year KTBs do not actively participate in trading or market making of 10-year KTB Futures.Last, the physical delivery, which is the method used for final settlement of 10-year KTB Futures, acts as constraint in trading long-term KTB Futures. The investors are not familiar with the physical delivery settlement and as trading of long-term KTBs in the cash market is not brisk, the investors felt burdened in securing the deliverable KTBs for the final settlement by physical delivery.As the favorable condition has been created to stimulate the trading of long-term KTB Futures, it is expected that trading of long-term KTBs in the cash market would thr
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Jul 21, 2010
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Jun 25, 2010
- 2010 Credit Risk Evaluations on Large Companies
- Evaluation ResultsCreditor banks announced today a total of 65 companies for restructuring after completing their credit risk evaluations on 1,985 companies with outstanding credit lines of more than KRW50.0 billion.Of the 65 companies, 16 were constructors with 9 rated C and 7 rated D; 3 shipbuilders with 1 rated C and 2 rated D; 1 shipping company rated C; and the remaining 45 large companies of which 27 were rated C and 18 rated D.Mainly as a result of the downturn in the construction industry, 16 companies were tapped for restructuring while the number of shipbuilding and shipping companies selected for restructuring fell from 17 last year.The Korean government is giving full consideration to help the restructuring process move forward as fast and effectively as possible while minimizing the weight of restructuring on the companies’ subcontractors.Impact on Financial Company SoundnessThe debt obligations of the 65 companies tapped for restructuring in this latest evaluation was KRW16.7 trillion, including KRW6.8 trillion in constructors PF contingent liabilities. Of the total, KRW11.9 trillion was due to banks, KRW1.5 trillion to savings banks, and KRW700 billion to credit specialized financial companies.Additional reserves for bad debts that financial institutions are expected to set aside for this round of restructuring is around KRW3.0 trillion, but its impact on financial companies’ soundness should be limited given banks’ strong financial position to absorb losses. As of end-March 2010, domestic banks’ BIS ratio was 14.7%, up from 12.31% as of end-2008 and 14.36% as of end-2009.Currently banks’ had KRW2.2 trillion in reserves set aside for bad debts while savings banks had KRW200 billion and other financial institutions KRW600 billion.*Please read the attached file for details.
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Jun 14, 2010
- 2ND Round of Strengthened Regualtion on Financial Institutions' FX Soundness
- BackgroundSince the government implemented the new rules to strengthen regulations on financial institutions’ FX soundness in January 2010, FX liquidity ratio has risen, the management of FX derivatives trade has been strengthened, and the overall FX soundness of banks has improved. However, the regulation to limit banks’ FX liquidity ratio has been applied to only domestic banks, not to local branches of foreign banks; therefore, foreign banks are still exposed to risks of mismatch between long-term assets in the Korean won and short-term borrowings in foreign currency.**Please read the attached file for details.Plans1. Regulations on domestic banks will be tightened to raise FX liquidity ratio and Mid-to 1. Regulations on domestic banks will be tightened to raise FX liquidity ratio and Mid-to FX liquidity ratio internally on a daily basis and report to financial authorities on a monthly basis. Securities held to maturity in foreign currency as well as foreign currency borrowings will be included when calculating the ratio of mid-to long-term financing in foreign loan portfolios. The ratio will be raised from 90% to 100%.2. The government will provide guidelines for local branches of foreign banks so that they can manage FX liquidity risk on a voluntary basis. Under the new guidelines, they will be advised to voluntarily manage their FX liquidity risks and acquire safer and longer term FX funding sources. However, some of the standards will be waived if their head office submits a letter of commitment to provide FX liquidity for its branch in Korea at times if needed. Implementing the new guidelines for local branches of foreign banks, a three-month grace period will be given to smooth out the transition. In managing FX liquidity risk, they will be subject to basically similar rules applied to domestic banks such as currency-specific liquidity risk management, diversification of funding source, and contingency funding plans. The guidelines will reflect opinions
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May 10, 2010
- Contingency Plans for Southern Europe's Financial Crisis
- Despite the EU-IMF rescue package* for Greece, financial markets faltered amid fears that southern European counties’ debt crisis could spread. Stock markets in the U.S. and Europe fell, and the KOSPI Index on May 6 fell 2% as well. The values of the US dollar and the yen against the Korean won surged. The US dollar against the Korean won on May 6 rose by KRW 25.8, and the yield of 3-year government bonds went up by 0.08%p.However, southern Europe’s debt crisis is expected to have only a limited impact on the Korean financial market because the domestic financial institutions’ exposure to the region is insignificant. As of end-2009, Korean financial companies’ exposure to southern European countries – Greece, Spain, Italy, and Portugal – is USD 640 million, just 1.2% of the USD 52.8 billion total external exposure. The total borrowings of Korean banks from those countries are only USD 390 million.As market concerns over southern Europe’s debt crisis and its contagion to Europe as a whole might persist for a while, the FSC plans to strengthen its monitoring on financial markets and European capital flows. To this end, the FSC and the FSS will closely monitor capital inflows and outflows and thoroughly examine domestic banks’ foreign liquidity soundness and external borrowing conditions.The FSC will utilize hot-lines and other communications channels with domestic banks to promptly detect and preemptively address market problems. We will also examine and complement individual banks’ contingency plans to raise their capital.Furthermore, in order to ease concerns in financial markets, the FSC will closely work together with the Ministry of Strategy and Finance (MOSF) and the Bank of Korea (BOK).At a global level, the Financial Stability Board (FSB) is expected to closely monitor the future developments of the Greek rescue package and promote global coordination through sharing information on each country’s fiscal and economic conditions.*Please refer
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Mar 26, 2010
- Regulation on Banks' Loan-to-Deposit Ratios
- In the 2010 Financial Policy Agenda announced in December 2009, the FSC unveiled its plans to adopt banks’ loan-to-deposit (LTD) ratio as one of its bank liquidity guidance ratios, which aims to encourage sound management of banks and alleviating factors driving the asset competition among banks. As a step to follow up with the announcement, the Regulation on Supervision of Banking Business is slated to be amended to employ banks’ liquidity or LTD ratio to measure bank management soundness after a notice and adjustment period between March 26 and April 15.BackgroundFor the past few years, expansion in mortgages and SME loans triggered off an asset competition among banks. As a result, signs of instability in banks’ liquidity became apparent during the 2008 financial crisis as bank debentures and other market-based capital served as funding sources while resources that are required to support stepped up lending were not backstopped with deposits.Although domestic banks’ LTD ratio was around 100% at the end of 2004, the ratio had risen sharply between 2005 and 2007 reaching 127.1% at the end of 2007. However, following the persistent guidance from the regulator to reduce the ratio since the second half of 2008, banks’ LTD ratio had fallen to 110.4% as of end-January 2010.Proposed ChangesThe planned changes in the regulation will apply to commercial banks in principle having won-denominated loans in excess of KRW2.0 trillion. This will include foreign bank branches, of which only HSBC will apply with KRW3.3 trillion in won-denominated loans as of December 2009, and the National Agricultural Cooperative Federation (NACF), the only one among the special purpose banks given the policy-driven nature of their loans.The ratio is calculated through the following method, excluding CDs: Loan-to-deposit ratio = won-denominated loans won/denominated deposits* * Demand deposits, savings deposits, time deposits (figures from bank balance sheets)The target for banks’ LTD
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Feb 23, 2010
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Feb 01, 2010
- Domestic Banks’ Preliminary SBL Ratios
- Since August 2009, Korea’s financial authorities have been encouraging domestic banks to lower their average SBL (substandard or below loans) target ratio to 1% by end-December 2009.As of end-December 2009, domestic banks’ SBL ratios averaged 0.99% to meet their target ratios, excluding the KRW3.0 trillion in debt obligations that arose in December from the unexpected workout of the Kumho Group affiliates and a number of shipbuilders*. *Kumho Industries, Kumho Tires, SLS Shipbuilding, 21st Century Shipbuilding, etc.When setting the target ratio, corporate restructuring-related SBLs were allowed to betaken out of calculation because they were expected to take longer to resolve through sales, dispositions, and other means.If these corporate restructuring-related SBLs are included, the average SBL ratio is 1.22%.The SBLs resolved in H2 2009 during the targeting period were KRW17.7 trillion, an increase of 47.5% over the KRW12.0 trillion resolved in H1 2009.Detailed FiguresDomestic banks’ end-2009 SBL ratios inclusive of the large restructuring-related debt of KRW3.0 trillion in December was 1.22%, dropping sharply by 0.29 percentage points from the end-June 2009 ratio of 1.51% on the back of support to lower SBL.In terms of amount, the total SBLs were KRW15.7 trillion, down KRW3.9 trillion or19.9% from KRW19.6 trillion at end-June 2009.By class, the SBL ratios of both corporate and household loans each fell by 0.33 and 0.16 percentage points respectively in H2 2009 to 1.58% and 0.48%.The SBL ratio of small and medium-sized enterprises (SME) was 1.82%, falling by a significant 0.67 percentage points during H2 2009. The SBL ratio of household and mortgage loans, meanwhile, was 0.48% and 0.37% respectively, the lowest levels for both since figures began to be kept for both in March 2002 and December 2005.In 2009, domestic banks resolved KRW29.7 trillion in SBL, double the KRW14.0 trillion resolved in the preceding year.Of the KRW29.7 trillion, KRW9.5 trillion was re
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Jan 20, 2010
- Risk Assessment of Banks' Mortgage Loans
- Household mortgage loans extended by banks totaled KRW 260.1 trillion at the end of September 2009, of which KRW 112.0 trillion (43.1%) are loans with lump-sum redemption contracts, and the remaining KRW 148.1 trillion (56.9%) are loans with redemption by installment contracts.Forty percent of the loans with lump-sum redemption contracts, KRW 44.7 trillion, will reach maturity in 2010.Fifteen percent of the loans with installment contracts, KRW 22.3 trillion, will start to be repaid with interest and principal in 2010.Risk AssessmentCompared with previous years, the amount of loans with lump-sum redemption contracts due in 2010 is relatively moderate. * *KRW44.3 trillion (2008), KRW43.3 trillion (2009), KRW44.7 trillion (2010)The numbers are estimated at the end of the previous year, with Sept. figures used for 2010.The loans with installment contracts, KRW 22.3 trillion, which will start to be repaid with interest and principal in 2010, have also decreased from KRW31.2 trillion of 2009.In particular, given that the rollover ratio of lump-sum payment loans exceeds 95%, the actual amount of household debt which poses a burden of full repayment is just around KRW 2 trillion.The extension of interest-only payment period for loans with redemption by installment contracts also helped to ease household financial bur den; from Nov. ’08 to Oct. ‘09, interest-only payment periods were extended for KRW 10.5 trillion in loans.Considering stabilizing housing prices* and low loan-to-value (LTV) ratio**, it is unlikely that the households’ debt repayment burden will significantly increase. *Housing price change (%, qoq): -1.0(1Q09), 0.4(2 Q), 1.3(3Q), 0.3(Nov), 0.1(Dec) **L TV ratio (’0 9 July): Korea 47.1%, U S 74.9%, U K 85.2% (end-December 2007)*Please read the attached file for details.
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Jan 10, 2010
- The 3rd FSB Plenary Meeting Report
- The FSC Chairman Chin Dong-Soo attended the 3rd FSB Plenary Meeting in Basel, Switzerland, on Saturday January 9. Chairman Chin checked how financial reform recommendations the G20 leaders mandated the FSB to make have been implemented and reaffirmed future directions and implementation schedules for financial reforms that will be taken by the FSB in 2010.In regard with the financial crisis, he assessed that as many related issues have been addressed and financial institutions have now easier access to liquidity and capital, thus many financial support programs have been stalled or curtailed. He, however, pointed out that despite the overall recovery from the crisis across the globe, the gap among various markets and individual financial institutions has been widening; therefore, he agreed that financial support for SMEs and othervulnerable sectors necessary to support the real economy should be sustained.Proposals to Stabilize the Foreign Exchange Markets in Emerging EconomiesWith respect to the “Proposals to Stabilize the Foreign Exchange Market in Emerging Economies,” endorsed at the G20 summit in Pittsburgh in September and the G20 finance ministers meeting in November, the FSC, prior to the meeting, distributed to the FSB members the report on the detailed background of the proposals and specific plans to implement. At the plenary meeting, the Korean government shared with the FSB members the report on the detailed background and policies that the Korean government introduced to enhance the soundness of foreign currency market and strengthen related regulations with the aim to reduce foreign currency liquidity risk.The report reasserted the need for international coordination to build a global financial safety net to protect emerging economies vulnerable to foreign currency liquidity risk. The report net to protect emerging economies vulnerable to foreign currency liquidity risk. The report help emerging economies reduce foreign liquidity risk by creating a
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Nov 19, 2009
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Oct 01, 2009
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Sep 11, 2009
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Aug 28, 2009
- Legislation Notice of Amendments to the Enforcement Decrees of the Banking Act and the Financial Holding Companies Act
- BackgroundThe Banking Act and the Financial Holding Companies Act were recently amended and will be enacted on October 10, 2009. Improvements were made to the restriction on shareholding of commercial banks and bank holding companies (hereinafter referred to as “banks”) by non-financial business operators (NFBO).The Korean government decided on enforcement decrees regarding FSC oversight of bank ownership by NFBOs and private equity funds (PEF). The FSC has proposed amendments to the enforcement decrees of the relevant acts in order to improve and supplement the existing system, such as the reporting of changes to bank ownership. Thus, this legislation notice will be in effect fromAugust 28 to September 7, 2009.Main PointsA. Matter related to the delegation and enactment of the amended Acts1. NFBO’s participation in bank managementUnder the amended Acts, when an NFBO wants to own more than 4% of bank shares and participate in management through appointing directors to the board, it must do so with a pre-approval from the FSC. Moreover, a stringent post-approval supervision* will be in place to prevent any conflict of interest or illegal transaction.*eligibility assessment of the largest shareholder; limiting transactions such as the bank providing credit lines to the largest shareholder; and on-site FSS audits conducted when accused of illegal transactions.“Participation in management” is defined as follows:The number of senior managers elected by the NFBO exceeds the regulated number of, for instance, one or two persons.The NFBO is involved in major decision-making process and regular business operations, and can limit bank management’s decision-making authority through agreements and contracts.2. Approval of NFBO’s bank ownershipi) Under the amended act, an NFBO must gain approval from the FSC to acquire more than 4% of bank shares and become the largest shareholder or participate in management. The relevant enforcement decree dictates th
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Jul 30, 2009
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Jul 16, 2009
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Jul 10, 2009
- Plans to Advance Financial Infrastructure of Funds Market
- Background IssuesEven as the funds market has continued growing in volume and quality, investors’ interest in funds are expected to rise further from a number of factors, such as an aging population.Among other contributing reasons, tax exemptions on overseas stocks and the need to globally diversify private assets caused assets under management to increase sharply at overseas investment funds, climbing from KRW9.1 trillion at end-2005 to KRW54.9 trillion as of June 18 this year.As the availability of asset classes for investment has increased, the variety of funds has also broadened to include real estate, special asset, derivatives and other assets in their funds.But at the same time, the financial infrastructure related to the funds market has been pointed out to have room for improvement.In a few exceptional cases, investors who held overseas investment funds and fund of funds took advantage of other beneficiary owners by buying into a fund with prior information on the direction of stock prices as funds’ base prices are based on the previous day’s closing prices.In other instances, shortfalls in the financial infrastructure related to overseas investment could erode investor confidence as a result of discrepancies in the base price of overseas investment funds.There is also a loss in efficiency as trades, settlement, and the review of assets held in overseas investment funds are conducted manually.Improvement PlansTo raise the level of confidence in the base price and improve the efficiency of fund-related systems, the financial supervisory authorities are to jointly develop the financial infrastructure of the funds market with the funds industry.To prevent buying a fund with foreknowledge in the direction of stock prices, the applicable base price of overseas investment funds and fund of funds will be changed from the current T+1 day to T+2 days. To prevent the frequent resetting of the base price, the current base price tolerance will be adjusted after
