Financial stability is a prerequisite to innovation and inclusive finance policies. FSC maintains close market monitoring for any signs of market volatility and works to ensure stability in the financial markets. There are risk factors originating from abroad and from within. FSC focuses on making our economy more resilient from external shocks, such as a disruption in the global supply chain, and supporting Korea’s material, component and equipment industries to help boost their global competitiveness. Internally, FSC is closely monitoring the trends in household debt and seeking reforms to corporate restructuring in order to prevent domestic risk factors from turning into systemic risks. Policies aimed at increasing financial stability also include enhancing fairness in the financial markets by introducing a comprehensive legal framework for the supervision of financial conglomerates, improving market discipline and promoting transparency in corporate disclosure and accounting practices.
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Mar 22, 2011
- Financial Measures to Support Normalization of Housing Transactions
- BackgroundIn order to stimulate the depressed housing market last year, the government announced the Aug. 29 measures including the temporary easing of the application of debt-to-income (DTI) ratio for mortgage loans. Since the implementation of the Aug. 29 measures, housing transactions have rebounded while household debt including mortgage loans continuously increased.*apartment transaction volume in Seoul metropolitan area (in thousands): 9.0 (Sept 2010)→12.4 (Oct)→17.5 (Nov)→20. 2 (Dec)→16.0 (Jan 2011)→19.0 (Feb)*mortgage lending (KRW in trillions): 2.6 (average from Jan to Aug 2010)→3.3 (Sept)→3.5 (Oct)→4.4 (Nov)→5.3(Dec)→1.8 (Jan 2011)→2.8 (Feb)Key Contents1. The temporary easing of the application of DTI ratio for mortgage loans will be expired at the end of March as scheduled, and the previously-imposed DTI limit* will be reinstated starting April.*the DTI ratio: 40% for speculative area, 50% for non-speculative area in Seoul, 60% for Incheon and Gyeonggi Province.2. The FSC has also come up with complementary measures to support non-speculative housing transactions.1) The raised cap for microcredit loans (from KRW50 million to KRW100 million), exempted from the DTI regulation, will be maintained to make sure that low-income households have no difficulties financing their housing purchase.2) Preferential treatment of higher lending limit using the DTI ratio will be given towards non-grace-period repayment loans along with fixed-rate loans and principal and interest installment loans.*non-grace-period loans: +5%p*fixed-rate loans: +5%p*principal and interest installment loans: +5%p※For example, for non-speculative Seoul area with 50% DTI application, if a mortgage is given out without a grace period and with fixed-rate principal and interest installments, 65% DTI will be applied.Expected EffectsBy reinstating the DTI regulation, the FSC aims to prevent borrowers from borrowing above their means. With the DTI limit back in place, we exp
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Mar 17, 2011
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Feb 23, 2011
- Unfair Trading Investigation Results and Penalties
- Violation of prohibition on market manipulation through the link between spot and futures by KOSPI200 stocks and derivatives trading on November 11, 2010, a KOSPI200 options’ expiry dateCase OverviewAccording to investigation results, AAA1), who is head of Absolute Strategy Group (ASG)- Asia of Deutsche Bank AG Hong Kong Branch, DDD, who is in charge of ASG - Global of New York Deutsche Bank Securities Inc., etc. conspired with EEE, who is managing director of Global Equity Derivatives (GED) at Deutsche Securities Korea, Deutsche Bank AG’s South Korean securities unit, to manipulate market prices in Korean capital markets.They had constructed speculative derivatives positions in advance through the combination of short synthetic futures and long put options. In order to gain profit from these speculative positions, they sold KRW2.4424 trillion (US$ 2.2 billion) worth of stocks listed in the KOSPI200, which they had purchased through index arbitrage trading and held during the last year (2010), in the last ten minutes before the market closed on Nov. 11, 2010, an expiry date for KOSPI200 options.Due to these massive manipulative orders, KOSPI200 index plunged 2.79% (254.62p → 247.51p) and they gained illegal profits of KRW44.87 billion (US$ 40.5 million) from market manipulation through the link between spot and futures (options) transaction.Investigation Activities and Enforcement ProcessA joint investigation team by the Financial Supervisory Service (FSS) and the Korea Exchange (KRX) was organized to commence an investigation on Nov. 12, 2010, the next day on which the incident occurred.- Investigation team members: five staffs in Special Investigation Team of the FSS, two staffs in Review Team 3 of the KRX- In-depth investigations were carried out for about two months from Nov. 12, 2010 to Jan. 21, 2011 which included interviews with involved persons and collecting evidences at the Deutsche Bank AG Hong Kong Branch, which placed massive orders to sell, and D
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Feb 21, 2011
- Further Actions Taken on MSB and Support Measures
- The Financial Services Commission (FSC) held a provisional meeting on Saturday, February 19, and decided to suspend operations of four additional savings banks: Busan Central Savings Bank; Busan 2 Savings Bank; Jeonju Savings Bank; and Bohae Savings Bank.Liquidity conditions of these four savings banks were not as bad as the two previously suspended banks (Busan Savings Bank and Daejeon Savings Bank); however, there have been massive deposit withdrawals following the announc ment of the two banks being suspended on February 17, so it became evident that these four savings banks would soon become incapable of paying back their customers’ deposits.An emergency meeting chaired by FSC Chairman Kim Seok-Dong convened this morning in Busan with relevant officials and institutions to discuss plans to minimize the impact of savings banks suspensions on depositors and SMEs in the region, and to provide sufficient liquidity for other savings banks.Participants of the meeting: FSC Chairman, Busan City Mayor, FSS Senior Deputy Governor, KDIC President, KIBO CEO, KODIT CEO, Busan Credit Guarantee Federation CEO, Korea Federation of Savings Banks CEO, IBK CEO, Kookmin Bank CEO, Busan Bank CEO, Nonghyup Credit Agency CEO, Busan Chamber of Commerce Deputy CEO and nine other CEOs of mutual savings banks in the region.Support Measures1. For Savings Banks and DepositorsTo minimize inconveniences of suspended savings banks’ depositors,(1) The government will make sure that depositors can receive provisional payments, a portion of deposits protected by the KDIC, in two weeks of suspensions, a week earlier than the standard procedure.(2) In order to meet depositors’ urgent needs for cash before provisional payments, the government will help them get a deposit-backed loan up to KRW 15 million per person from four commercial banks (Kookmin, NH, IBK and Busan Banks). (3) The government will raise a ceiling on deposit-backed loans up to 80% of deposits to meet additional needs for liqu
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Jan 11, 2011
- Regulatory Follow-Up Measures For Nov.11 Stock Market Plunge
- BackgroundThe Financial Services Commission (FSC) and Financial Supervisory Service (FSS) have developed measures to improve derivatives-related trading system jointly with the Korea Exchange (KRX) and the Korea Financial Investment Association (KOFIA) based on the investigation of risk management status of financial investment companies and a public hearing held on December 20, 2010 after the stock market plunged on an option expiry day, November 11, 2010.The latest regulatory measures are designed to prevent the recurrence of a similar event on expiry dates of futures and options contracts and mitigate risks arising from derivatives investment by institutional investors, seeking to keep capital markets sounder and more efficient.Regulators are thoroughly investigating and inspecting alleged acts of unfair trading and violations of asset management-related laws that caused a market plunge on the option expiry day and will take appropriate actions against any violation of laws.Investigation updates1. Investigation of alleged acts of unfair tradingThe FSS conducted an on-site investigation in Hong Kong in December 2010 and is currently working to determine if any act of violating the Capital Market and Financial Investment Business Act, including market manipulation, was involved.Any violation of laws will be punished according to laws, if found.2. Examination of Wise Asset ManagementRight after the option shock incident, examiners conducted a probe into Wise Asset Management from November 12 to December 3, 2010 to identify the cause of the incident and check the adequacy of derivatives fund operation and internal control system.Regulators will complete the analysis of the inspection results as soon as possible and proceed to impose sanctions against any violation, if found.3. Risk management in the financial investment industryThe FSS examined financial investment companies to check their risk management status and whether they were in compliance with the margin rul
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Dec 20, 2010
- Macro-prudential Stability Levy
- BackgroundThe Korean government plans to impose Macro-prudential Stability Levy (“the Levy”) on non-deposit foreign currency liabilities with three motivations.First, the key factor of the past two financial crises in 1997 and 2008 was sudden capital outflows following excessive capital inflows during boom periods. Like many otheremerging and developing countries with a small and open economy, Korea is highly vulnerable to changes in the global economy and sudden capital movements. Of the various capital flows, overseas borrowings are the most volatile, in particular short-term ones. The Korean government, which has reinforced macro-prudential measures toreduce volatility in capital movement within the framework of an open and liberalized economy, now decided to introduce the Levy.Second, the need to curb massive capital inflows in the form of carry trade into Korea is growing as global liquidity has been rapidly increased by Quantitative Easing measures (QE) and the exceptionally low interest rates in advanced countries. A surge of capitalinflows could lead to inflation and asset price bubbles, and a sudden reversal of such inflows could possibly result in a systemic risk.In addition, the Levy will be used as to provide liquidity when necessary to help the Korean economy cope with external shocks.The introduction of the Levy is consistent with the global trend, in particular with the communiqué of the G20 Seoul summit where the leaders have agreed on the need for design and implementation of macro-prudential measures to curb excessive capital flows. Germany, the United Kingdom and France are about to impose the financial levy from January 2011 with the aim of repairing the financial system or procuring resolution fund. Against this backdrop, the Korean government plans to adopt the Levy as a pre-emptive and precautionary measure to stabilize both financial market and economy as a whole.Key characteristics of the Levy1. ImpositionIn order to strengthen macro-pr
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Dec 02, 2010
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Nov 22, 2010
- Countermeasures against KOSPI's Sudden Plunge on Nov. 11
- BackgroundThe KOSPI index plunged 48 points in the last ten minutes before the market closed on November 11, the options expiry date of the month, as foreign investors cleared their arbitrage positions by selling off KRW2.4 trillion worth of shares.Out of the sell-off worth KRW 2.4 trillion, it turned out that 97% of sell orders were made through a single trading desk. We, the FSC/FSS and Korea Exchange, are currently investigating whether the massive sell-off through the brokerage involved any alleged act of unfair trading.We are also probing into a local investment company, WiseAsset, who suffered huge losses from options trading on November 11, with particular focus on any illegality of the company’s asset management and its internal risk management system.Fluctuations in stock prices are inherent part of capital markets; however, severe volatility over a short period of time caused by a few market forces could leave individual investors unprotected and undermine investors’ credibility in Korean capital markets. In this respect, we plan to thoroughly investigate causes of the incident and come up with needed measures to make capital markets in Korea more stable.Upon a thorough investigation on whether there was any act of unfair trading involved and whether the financial investment company properly managed its investment risks, any violation of relevant laws and regulations will be dealt with strict sanctions to prevent a recurrence of a similar event.Measures to comeThe FSC/FSS will thoroughly review vulnerabilities of Korea’s capital markets as revealed on Nov. 11 and take prompt actions to bring immediately needed reforms to the current market system and practices. Depending on the results of the investigations, we will come up with follow-up measures for the longer term. A. Immediate actions1. Strengthening brokerage firms’ settlement risk managementBrokerage firms are exposed to the so-called settlement risk because they are the first to take respons
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Sep 02, 2010
- Stimulation Plan for Long-term KTB Futures Trade Approved by FSC
- To promote trading of long-term KTB futures, the KRX amended its Derivatives Market Business Regulation and the Financial Services Commission (FSC) approved the amended Regulation on September 1, 2010.As the follow-up of the plan for promoting long-term KTB futures that was devised jointly by the Financial Services Commission, Ministry of Strategy and Finance and KRX, the latest amendment streamlined the regulations related to KTB futures.The key amendments are 1) the harmonization of regulations governing KTB futures to ensure the balanced growth of short-term and long-term KTB futures, 2) stabilization of market operation and 3) reinforcement of market making function in the Derivatives Market.1. Harmonization of regulations governing individual KTB futuresBy minimizing the differences in the regulations applied to short-term and long-term KTB futures, it has been attempted to make easy the trade linking the short-term and long-term KTB futures contracts and enhance the accessibility of KTB futures.(1) To ensure the settlement expediency of 10-year KTB Futures, the plan is made to change the final settlement method from physical delivery to cash settlement. Accordingly, like the case of 3-year KTB Futures, the final settlement price of 10- year KTB Futures will be calculated on the basis of yield of basket bonds for final settlement and present value model for underlying bond and the final settlement day will be changed to T+1 day, i.e., the day after the last trading day, from the existing T+2 day. (2) By considering the recent market interest rate, the coupon rate of underlying bonds of 3-year and 5-year KTB Futures would be lowered to 5% per year from 8% per year in order to enhance the hedge effectiveness.(3) The plan is made to increase the trading unit of 10-year KTB Futures to KRW 100 million at par value from KRW 50 million at par value and lower the quotation unit to 0.01 from current 0.02. However, the tick value of KRW 10,000 will be kept unchanged.(4)
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Aug 02, 2010
- Plans to Enhance the Short-term Financing Market
- Current Status-quo of the Short-term Financing MarketBy short-term financing, we mean wholesale financing among financial institutions by trading or issuing under 1- year maturity products such as Calls, RPs, CPs, and CDs.An analysis of current situation by individual market sectors① (Call Market) Daily average volume of KRW 33 trillion*, which takes up about 50% of the short term financing market.* Reduced down to KRW 11 trillion level, but recently resumed to the pre-crisis level.(’08.9: KRW 29 trillion, ’09.3: KRW 11.5 trillion, ’09.12: KRW 30.2 trillion, ’10.6: KRW 33.1 trillion)② (RP) Trading volume (outstanding balance base) has been consistently growing.(’07: KRW 65 trillion, ’08: KRW 69 trillion, ’09: KRW 72 trillion). Most of the transactions (87%) are large client based.③ (CD) Dropped to KRW 79 trillion level due to the curb on Loan-to-Deposit Ratio regulation, while market trading volume has gone down to KRW 4.5 trillion daily average.Source: Bank of KoreaProblems Detected in the Short-Term Financing MarketThe overriding problem in the short-term financing market is that it is too much concentrated on the Call market which causes distortions to the market function and may entail latent systemic risk.- The convenience of Call transactions using credit based lending with high liquidity and low interest rate triggered the growing dependency of the Call market by financial institutions.- Composition of the short term financing market (as of May ’10): Call (50.5%), RP (16%), CP (17.2%), CD (16.4%) - The Call market’s function has been misled as ‘funding sources’ for the secondary financial institutions’ (e.g. securities houses and mutual savings banks) operating capital and in turn used to invest in high yielding short term KTBs.- In particular, excessive ‘call money’ by securities houses could become a source of potential systemic risk when hit by a sudden credit crunch.- The over-usage of the Call market also led to the unde
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Jul 27, 2010
- Stimulation Plan for Long-term KTB Futures Trade
- The Ministry of Strategy and Finance, Financial Services Commission and Korea Exchange (“KRX”) have jointly prepared the plan to stimulate trading of long-term Korea Treasury Bond (“KTB”) Futures.Recently, an opportunity to promote the trading of long-term KTBs has been presented as a result of growing issuance amount and trading volume of long-term KTBs. As the need to stimulate the 10-year KTB Futures trading volume grew, the task force made of representatives of research community, public sector and private sector was created in January 2010 to prepare the plan for promotion of long-term KTB Futures trade.The causes for poor trading of long-term KTB Futures may be examined in terms of cash market, market making and trading regulations.First, although the annual issuance amount of short-term and long-term KTBs is balanced , the trading condition in the secondary market is dominated by the short-term KTBs. For example, as of the end of June 2010, the outstanding amount of KTBs with maturity longer than 10-year is 46% of total outstanding amount of KTBs, but the trading volume of KTBs with maturity longer than 10-year is mere 13% of total trading volume of KTBs.Second, the market making for 10-year KTB Futures is rather inadequate and the primary dealers (“the PDs”) who account for over 53% of trading volume of 10-year KTBs do not actively participate in trading or market making of 10-year KTB Futures.Last, the physical delivery, which is the method used for final settlement of 10-year KTB Futures, acts as constraint in trading long-term KTB Futures. The investors are not familiar with the physical delivery settlement and as trading of long-term KTBs in the cash market is not brisk, the investors felt burdened in securing the deliverable KTBs for the final settlement by physical delivery.As the favorable condition has been created to stimulate the trading of long-term KTB Futures, it is expected that trading of long-term KTBs in the cash market would thr
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Jul 21, 2010
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Jun 25, 2010
- 2010 Credit Risk Evaluations on Large Companies
- Evaluation ResultsCreditor banks announced today a total of 65 companies for restructuring after completing their credit risk evaluations on 1,985 companies with outstanding credit lines of more than KRW50.0 billion.Of the 65 companies, 16 were constructors with 9 rated C and 7 rated D; 3 shipbuilders with 1 rated C and 2 rated D; 1 shipping company rated C; and the remaining 45 large companies of which 27 were rated C and 18 rated D.Mainly as a result of the downturn in the construction industry, 16 companies were tapped for restructuring while the number of shipbuilding and shipping companies selected for restructuring fell from 17 last year.The Korean government is giving full consideration to help the restructuring process move forward as fast and effectively as possible while minimizing the weight of restructuring on the companies’ subcontractors.Impact on Financial Company SoundnessThe debt obligations of the 65 companies tapped for restructuring in this latest evaluation was KRW16.7 trillion, including KRW6.8 trillion in constructors PF contingent liabilities. Of the total, KRW11.9 trillion was due to banks, KRW1.5 trillion to savings banks, and KRW700 billion to credit specialized financial companies.Additional reserves for bad debts that financial institutions are expected to set aside for this round of restructuring is around KRW3.0 trillion, but its impact on financial companies’ soundness should be limited given banks’ strong financial position to absorb losses. As of end-March 2010, domestic banks’ BIS ratio was 14.7%, up from 12.31% as of end-2008 and 14.36% as of end-2009.Currently banks’ had KRW2.2 trillion in reserves set aside for bad debts while savings banks had KRW200 billion and other financial institutions KRW600 billion.*Please read the attached file for details.
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Jun 14, 2010
- 2ND Round of Strengthened Regualtion on Financial Institutions' FX Soundness
- BackgroundSince the government implemented the new rules to strengthen regulations on financial institutions’ FX soundness in January 2010, FX liquidity ratio has risen, the management of FX derivatives trade has been strengthened, and the overall FX soundness of banks has improved. However, the regulation to limit banks’ FX liquidity ratio has been applied to only domestic banks, not to local branches of foreign banks; therefore, foreign banks are still exposed to risks of mismatch between long-term assets in the Korean won and short-term borrowings in foreign currency.**Please read the attached file for details.Plans1. Regulations on domestic banks will be tightened to raise FX liquidity ratio and Mid-to 1. Regulations on domestic banks will be tightened to raise FX liquidity ratio and Mid-to FX liquidity ratio internally on a daily basis and report to financial authorities on a monthly basis. Securities held to maturity in foreign currency as well as foreign currency borrowings will be included when calculating the ratio of mid-to long-term financing in foreign loan portfolios. The ratio will be raised from 90% to 100%.2. The government will provide guidelines for local branches of foreign banks so that they can manage FX liquidity risk on a voluntary basis. Under the new guidelines, they will be advised to voluntarily manage their FX liquidity risks and acquire safer and longer term FX funding sources. However, some of the standards will be waived if their head office submits a letter of commitment to provide FX liquidity for its branch in Korea at times if needed. Implementing the new guidelines for local branches of foreign banks, a three-month grace period will be given to smooth out the transition. In managing FX liquidity risk, they will be subject to basically similar rules applied to domestic banks such as currency-specific liquidity risk management, diversification of funding source, and contingency funding plans. The guidelines will reflect opinions
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May 10, 2010
- Contingency Plans for Southern Europe's Financial Crisis
- Despite the EU-IMF rescue package* for Greece, financial markets faltered amid fears that southern European counties’ debt crisis could spread. Stock markets in the U.S. and Europe fell, and the KOSPI Index on May 6 fell 2% as well. The values of the US dollar and the yen against the Korean won surged. The US dollar against the Korean won on May 6 rose by KRW 25.8, and the yield of 3-year government bonds went up by 0.08%p.However, southern Europe’s debt crisis is expected to have only a limited impact on the Korean financial market because the domestic financial institutions’ exposure to the region is insignificant. As of end-2009, Korean financial companies’ exposure to southern European countries – Greece, Spain, Italy, and Portugal – is USD 640 million, just 1.2% of the USD 52.8 billion total external exposure. The total borrowings of Korean banks from those countries are only USD 390 million.As market concerns over southern Europe’s debt crisis and its contagion to Europe as a whole might persist for a while, the FSC plans to strengthen its monitoring on financial markets and European capital flows. To this end, the FSC and the FSS will closely monitor capital inflows and outflows and thoroughly examine domestic banks’ foreign liquidity soundness and external borrowing conditions.The FSC will utilize hot-lines and other communications channels with domestic banks to promptly detect and preemptively address market problems. We will also examine and complement individual banks’ contingency plans to raise their capital.Furthermore, in order to ease concerns in financial markets, the FSC will closely work together with the Ministry of Strategy and Finance (MOSF) and the Bank of Korea (BOK).At a global level, the Financial Stability Board (FSB) is expected to closely monitor the future developments of the Greek rescue package and promote global coordination through sharing information on each country’s fiscal and economic conditions.*Please refer
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Mar 26, 2010
- Regulation on Banks' Loan-to-Deposit Ratios
- In the 2010 Financial Policy Agenda announced in December 2009, the FSC unveiled its plans to adopt banks’ loan-to-deposit (LTD) ratio as one of its bank liquidity guidance ratios, which aims to encourage sound management of banks and alleviating factors driving the asset competition among banks. As a step to follow up with the announcement, the Regulation on Supervision of Banking Business is slated to be amended to employ banks’ liquidity or LTD ratio to measure bank management soundness after a notice and adjustment period between March 26 and April 15.BackgroundFor the past few years, expansion in mortgages and SME loans triggered off an asset competition among banks. As a result, signs of instability in banks’ liquidity became apparent during the 2008 financial crisis as bank debentures and other market-based capital served as funding sources while resources that are required to support stepped up lending were not backstopped with deposits.Although domestic banks’ LTD ratio was around 100% at the end of 2004, the ratio had risen sharply between 2005 and 2007 reaching 127.1% at the end of 2007. However, following the persistent guidance from the regulator to reduce the ratio since the second half of 2008, banks’ LTD ratio had fallen to 110.4% as of end-January 2010.Proposed ChangesThe planned changes in the regulation will apply to commercial banks in principle having won-denominated loans in excess of KRW2.0 trillion. This will include foreign bank branches, of which only HSBC will apply with KRW3.3 trillion in won-denominated loans as of December 2009, and the National Agricultural Cooperative Federation (NACF), the only one among the special purpose banks given the policy-driven nature of their loans.The ratio is calculated through the following method, excluding CDs: Loan-to-deposit ratio = won-denominated loans won/denominated deposits* * Demand deposits, savings deposits, time deposits (figures from bank balance sheets)The target for banks’ LTD
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Feb 23, 2010
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Feb 01, 2010
- Domestic Banks’ Preliminary SBL Ratios
- Since August 2009, Korea’s financial authorities have been encouraging domestic banks to lower their average SBL (substandard or below loans) target ratio to 1% by end-December 2009.As of end-December 2009, domestic banks’ SBL ratios averaged 0.99% to meet their target ratios, excluding the KRW3.0 trillion in debt obligations that arose in December from the unexpected workout of the Kumho Group affiliates and a number of shipbuilders*. *Kumho Industries, Kumho Tires, SLS Shipbuilding, 21st Century Shipbuilding, etc.When setting the target ratio, corporate restructuring-related SBLs were allowed to betaken out of calculation because they were expected to take longer to resolve through sales, dispositions, and other means.If these corporate restructuring-related SBLs are included, the average SBL ratio is 1.22%.The SBLs resolved in H2 2009 during the targeting period were KRW17.7 trillion, an increase of 47.5% over the KRW12.0 trillion resolved in H1 2009.Detailed FiguresDomestic banks’ end-2009 SBL ratios inclusive of the large restructuring-related debt of KRW3.0 trillion in December was 1.22%, dropping sharply by 0.29 percentage points from the end-June 2009 ratio of 1.51% on the back of support to lower SBL.In terms of amount, the total SBLs were KRW15.7 trillion, down KRW3.9 trillion or19.9% from KRW19.6 trillion at end-June 2009.By class, the SBL ratios of both corporate and household loans each fell by 0.33 and 0.16 percentage points respectively in H2 2009 to 1.58% and 0.48%.The SBL ratio of small and medium-sized enterprises (SME) was 1.82%, falling by a significant 0.67 percentage points during H2 2009. The SBL ratio of household and mortgage loans, meanwhile, was 0.48% and 0.37% respectively, the lowest levels for both since figures began to be kept for both in March 2002 and December 2005.In 2009, domestic banks resolved KRW29.7 trillion in SBL, double the KRW14.0 trillion resolved in the preceding year.Of the KRW29.7 trillion, KRW9.5 trillion was re
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Jan 20, 2010
- Risk Assessment of Banks' Mortgage Loans
- Household mortgage loans extended by banks totaled KRW 260.1 trillion at the end of September 2009, of which KRW 112.0 trillion (43.1%) are loans with lump-sum redemption contracts, and the remaining KRW 148.1 trillion (56.9%) are loans with redemption by installment contracts.Forty percent of the loans with lump-sum redemption contracts, KRW 44.7 trillion, will reach maturity in 2010.Fifteen percent of the loans with installment contracts, KRW 22.3 trillion, will start to be repaid with interest and principal in 2010.Risk AssessmentCompared with previous years, the amount of loans with lump-sum redemption contracts due in 2010 is relatively moderate. * *KRW44.3 trillion (2008), KRW43.3 trillion (2009), KRW44.7 trillion (2010)The numbers are estimated at the end of the previous year, with Sept. figures used for 2010.The loans with installment contracts, KRW 22.3 trillion, which will start to be repaid with interest and principal in 2010, have also decreased from KRW31.2 trillion of 2009.In particular, given that the rollover ratio of lump-sum payment loans exceeds 95%, the actual amount of household debt which poses a burden of full repayment is just around KRW 2 trillion.The extension of interest-only payment period for loans with redemption by installment contracts also helped to ease household financial bur den; from Nov. ’08 to Oct. ‘09, interest-only payment periods were extended for KRW 10.5 trillion in loans.Considering stabilizing housing prices* and low loan-to-value (LTV) ratio**, it is unlikely that the households’ debt repayment burden will significantly increase. *Housing price change (%, qoq): -1.0(1Q09), 0.4(2 Q), 1.3(3Q), 0.3(Nov), 0.1(Dec) **L TV ratio (’0 9 July): Korea 47.1%, U S 74.9%, U K 85.2% (end-December 2007)*Please read the attached file for details.
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Jan 10, 2010
- The 3rd FSB Plenary Meeting Report
- The FSC Chairman Chin Dong-Soo attended the 3rd FSB Plenary Meeting in Basel, Switzerland, on Saturday January 9. Chairman Chin checked how financial reform recommendations the G20 leaders mandated the FSB to make have been implemented and reaffirmed future directions and implementation schedules for financial reforms that will be taken by the FSB in 2010.In regard with the financial crisis, he assessed that as many related issues have been addressed and financial institutions have now easier access to liquidity and capital, thus many financial support programs have been stalled or curtailed. He, however, pointed out that despite the overall recovery from the crisis across the globe, the gap among various markets and individual financial institutions has been widening; therefore, he agreed that financial support for SMEs and othervulnerable sectors necessary to support the real economy should be sustained.Proposals to Stabilize the Foreign Exchange Markets in Emerging EconomiesWith respect to the “Proposals to Stabilize the Foreign Exchange Market in Emerging Economies,” endorsed at the G20 summit in Pittsburgh in September and the G20 finance ministers meeting in November, the FSC, prior to the meeting, distributed to the FSB members the report on the detailed background of the proposals and specific plans to implement. At the plenary meeting, the Korean government shared with the FSB members the report on the detailed background and policies that the Korean government introduced to enhance the soundness of foreign currency market and strengthen related regulations with the aim to reduce foreign currency liquidity risk.The report reasserted the need for international coordination to build a global financial safety net to protect emerging economies vulnerable to foreign currency liquidity risk. The report net to protect emerging economies vulnerable to foreign currency liquidity risk. The report help emerging economies reduce foreign liquidity risk by creating a